Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble Minded by Ballantine, Henry W.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 9 | Issue 4 Article 4
1919
Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble
Minded
Henry W. Ballantine
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Henry W. Ballantine, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble Minded, 9 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 485 (May 1918
to February 1919)
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INSANE
AND FEEBLE MINDED
HENRY W. BALLANTINE.1
It is the theory of some philanthropists and insanity experts that
a criminal offence is always a symptom of mental disease. According
to their theory only the innocent could ever be punished. If a man
robs or kills, the fault is not his; he is the victim of an hereditary taint
or of his unfortunate environment, to be pitied, but not to be blamed
or punished. Such ultra-pacifistic condonation of all crime unfortu-
nately prejudices many practical persons against much needed reforms,
such as the discriminating use of psychological tests of mental deft-
ciency to guide our dealings with delinquents, young and old.
In nearly every capital charge when other defences appear hope-
less, insanity is put forward as a last resort. The apprehension of
abuse and fabrication of the plea of insanity, like that of drunkenness,
reacts on the law to make it restrict the defence where theoretical
justice would demand it. A majority of jurisdictions thus refuse to
recognize uncontrollable impulse as a defence, unless the defendant
was unable to distinguish right from wrong.2 In 1911 a committee
of the New York Bar Association recommended the statutory abolition
of the defence of insanity, and drafted a proposal that insanity at the
time of the act, regardless of the condition at the time of the trial,
should be ground for confinement in an asylum for the criminal insane
for a definite period."
In the State of Washington in 1909 a statute was enacted, that
it should be no defence in criminal cases that the defendant was unable
by reason of his insanity, idiocy or imbecility, to comprehend the
nature and quality of the act committed, or to understand that it was
wrong or that he was afflicted with a morbid propensity to commit
the act. This statute was held unconstitutional, because it takes from
the jury the question of criminal intent, thereby violating the "due
'Dean of the College of Law. University of Illinois (Urbana), an address
delivered at the meeting of the Illinois State's Attorneys' Association.
2S1,ith v. Mississippi, 95 Miss. 786, 49 So. 945, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1461,
note; Ann. Cas. 1912 A, 36 n. Compare Hankinis v. State, L. R. A. 1918 D,
794 note.
3New York State Bar Association Reports, Vol. 33, p. 401; Vol. 34, p. 274,
278. 2 Jr. Crim. Law and Criminology, p. 531.
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process" and trial by jury clauses, on the question of whether the
mental element required by law was present.
4
By the Trial of Lunatics Act (1883) in England, if at the trial
for any offence, the evidence indicates that the defendant was insane,
the jury must find specially that he was guilty of the offence charged,
but was insane at such time. If they so find, the court is to order him
kept in custody as a criminal lunatic until further order. The Act
abolishes the verdict of acquittal on the ground of insanity and sub-
stitutes a special verdict. This prevents the plea of insanity from
being set up upon any but capital charges.
In spite of the disrepute of insanity pleas and insanity experts,
it is likely that there are many more insane, defective and irresponsible
persons who are unjustly convicted of crime than there are guilty
persons who succeed in escaping by pretended insanity. It requires
a good actor to feign insanity, whereas there are common varieties of
mental disease which may escape ordinary observation. This is
shown in the Tenth and Eleventh Annual Reports of the Municipal
Court- of Chicago (December* 1915 to December 1917), much of the
space of which is given to the work of the psycopathic laboratory
under Dr. William J. Hickson. The report of the laboratory is based
on studies of 4,486 cases for mental abnormalities.5
Dr. Hickson's report emphasizes the wide prevalence of feeble
mindedness among delinquents. Classified statistics are given with
regard to offenders referred to the laboratory by the various -criminal
branches, showing the mental level of the offenders examined and the
conditions of arrested development or insanity found. Among those
examined were a certain number of average intelligence (p. 258).
Below these come the so-called "'Sociopaths" of different grades, rang-
ing from a mental age of 12 to 15 years. Below these come the
Morons; the high.grade morons ranging in mental age from 9 to 11
years; middle grade morons from 8 to 9 years, and low grade morons
from-7 to 8 years. Below the morons fall the imbeciles, who corres-
-pond with children 4, 5 and 6.years old; lastly, the idiots, who cor-
respond .with children not over three years of age.
.Mental .defectives fall into two great classes, viz., Amentia and
Dementia; those with "intelligence defect," subdivided into idiots and
imbeciles, morons, sociopaths, and those suffering from paresis, senile
4Strasburg v. State (1910). 60'Vrash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1216, 2 Jr. Crim. Law, p. 521, 529.
5A popular exposition of this report is given by Herbert Harley, in the
Journal of the American Judicature Society 'for October, 1918 (Vol. 2, p. 69,
entitled, "Understanding the Criminal").
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dementia and the effects of alchohol and narcotics; and secondly, those
with "affective defects" under which are included the insanities, such
as dementia praecox, the progressive, incurable decay of the mind often
showing itself in early youth. Dementia praecox is divided by Dr.
Hickson into a number of varieties (p. 142), paranoid, katatonic,
hebephrenic and schizophrenic.
Dr. Hickson employs extensions of the Binet-Simon and other
intelligence tests, not only to evaluate intelligence per se, but also to
diagnose the various disturbances of the intelligence function and
differentiate the various psychoses, such as the different forms of
dementia praecox, manic depressive insanity, hysteria, etc. (Report,
p. 277). If these results prove reliable, this extension of the intelli-
gence tests for differential diagnostic purposes in psycopathic cases
is a remarkable achievement.
The feeble minded question is important, but not so important
as the praecox. Dementia praecox is often found combined with
feeble mindedness, and this combination results in a type of disorder
designated by Dr. Hickson by the horrible name of "Pfrophfhebe-
frenia." This is a dangerous criminal type inclined to such crimes as
homicide, robbery, rape, and sexual offences. In general dementia
praecox may be. regarded as an active instigator- in contrast to feeble
mindedness, which may be regarded as a passive instigator of crime,
destroying the capacity for inhibition, Idiots and imbeciles exhibit
early their mental defect and are easily detected, but the moron and
the dementia praecox case whose mental defect appears later, are the
dangerous types in, need of expert attention, as the others are too
low. mentally to be dangerous.
Dr. Hickson criticises. our present legal test of criminal responsi-
bility in relation to mental disease on page 137 of this report. He says:
"The right and wrong-test, which is-the legal criterion of mental re-
sponsibility, was promulgated in 1843 (McNaghten's case). It is applicable
to but a few diseases, and these must be.in such outspoken form in order to be
alplicable that the individual is incapable of perpetrating most any of the
ordinary crimes; therefore this law, if rigidly interpreted, nullifies itself.
The conditions to which it.would apply would be those in which intelligence
defect is primarily involved, such as 'paresis,' 'senile dementia,' 'feeble
mindedness'; thereby omitting the large group of insanities in which the
affective or emotional sphere is primarily involved, and the intellectual only
secondarily. Most of the continental criminal codes are so drawn up as
to include the affective or emotional insanities."
It is generally recognized that mere mental weakness or disorder,
feeble mindedness, degeneracy, moral depravity, or even insanity, do
not exempt from punishment where there is capacity to know that the
act is wrong.6 The- tests of criminal responsibility generally adopted
in this country are (1) the right and wrong test (a) in the abstract,
(b) as regards the particular act, and (c) as regards moral or legal
wrong; and (2) the irresistible impulse test. The Supreme Court of
New Hampshire denies the utility of any specific legal test, and
leaves it to the jury as a question of fact whether the crime was the
product of mental disease.7  Another test which has been suggested
is capacity to conceive the specific intent which constitutes one of the
elements of the particular crime.8 Delusion is not recognized by
English or American courts as a special test, but is simply one form
of aberration which destroys knowledge of right and wrong or creates
mistakes of fact.
The right and wrong test may be applied in such a. way as to
convict almost any one except a total idiot or a raving manic, or in
such a way as "to allow very considerable fish of the malefactor
species to escape from the judicial net."9  Juries exercise the actual,
albeit unauthorized, power to mitigate the rigors of the law by re-
fusing to convict and by dealing with cases according to what they
feel to be right an. just. It is desirable, however, for the law to
formulate intelligently what it is driving at.
A committee of the American Tnstitute of Criminal Law and
Criminology has devoted much study to the problem of determining
the relation of insanity to criminal responsibility. This committee was
composed of four physicians and five lawyers, with Prof. E. R. Keedy
of the University of Pennsylvania as Chairman. This committee
after several years of study, reported a bill providing a test for deter-
mining criminal responsibility when the defence of insanity is raised,
and a method for taking expert testimony1
The test adopted in the proposed bill provides that the accused's
mental disorder shall be a defence when "by reason of such mental
disease he did not have the particular state of mind that must accom-
pany such act or omission in order to constitute the crime charged."
The bill does not attempt to define what is meant by "the particular
616 Corpus Juris, 99; Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 67, 10 L. R .A. (N. S.) 999,
note; People v. Spencer, 264 Ill. 124; Commonwealth v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138,
42 AtI. 542.7State V. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242.8]Bishop "Criminal Law" sec. 381; State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 75 A. S. R.
529. Keedy. 30 Harv. Law Rev. 585.
OF. W. Griffin. "Insanity as a Defence," Journ. Crim. Law & Crim. II, No.
2, July, 1910. p. 18.
1Ojournal Cr. Law and Crim., II. p. 521. This bill is discussed in a
learned article by Prof. Keedy in the Harvard Law Review, XXX, pp. 535 and
724 (1917).
HENRY W. BALLANTINE488 -
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 489
state of mind that must accompany such act!" If this refers to the
specific intent, then the proposal adds nothing to the existing law
but subtracts from it. This would be the same as the present harsh
rule in regard to intoxication."' Drunkenness or even temporary in-
sanity produced by voluntary intoxication which renders a person
unconscious of. what he is doing, furnishes no excuse, except to
negative specific intent.
If on the other hand "the particular state of mind" includes a
mind that is sufficiently sane to be held accountable (in other words,
general intent), then the proposed test comes down to the absurd
truism that no person shall be convicted who by reason of mental
disease did not have the proper, degree of rationality that must
accompany the act in order to constitute a crime. This simply begs
the question and travels in a very small circle. As the Supreme Court
of Illinois said in Chase v. People,12 "Sanity is an ingredient in crime
as essential as the overt act, and if sanity is wanting, there is no
crime." The proposed test sheds no light whatever on the vexed
question whether irresistible impulse destroys responsibility.
The excuse of insanity cannot be confined to absence of specific
intent.18 Take murder, for example; the specific intent would certainly
be supplied by an intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm. A
raving maniac intentionally kills his keeper. How does the proposed
test help to determine his responsibility? Insanity may not negative
the specific intent to kill any more than intent to rape or to forge;
yet it may negative "general intent," or mens rea, which includes a
morally accountable and punishable mind7 4 All the elements of the
particular crime, including the specific intent, may be present, but
not the general conditions of criminal responsibility, which are the
same for all crimes. This is the great difference between insanity and
voluntary intoxication as a defence. Intoxication is no excuse except
when it negatives specific intent, whereas, insanity affords an excuse
even where the specific intent may be present. Prof. Keedy, in his
article and report, practically ignores the subjective conditions of
general intent as contrasted with the variable specific intent.
It is surprising to find so much confusion and uncertainty in the
authorities on the most fundamental principle of the criminal law, that
"Upstone v. P.. 109 11. 169; Cheadle v. State (Okla.), 149 Pac. 919;
L. R. A. 1915 E 1031.
1240 III. 352. 358.
13Markby, Elements of Law, sec. 729.
14Stroud. Mens Rea, p. 18. Silas Alward, Mens Rea, 38 Canadian Law
Times 646 (Oct., 1918).
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every crime involves the joint operation of act and intent. The
maxim is frequently quoted "Actus not facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea.15 This maxim has been said to be the foundation of all criminal
justice. 6 The cases and text writers, however, fail to agree upon a
clear cut, authoritative exposition of mens rea. In the great case of
Regina v. Tolson,17 Stephen, J., discusses nwns rea but without his
usual perspicacity. He seems to identify it with specific intent, which
varies in different crimes. He denies that there is any such thing as a
general criminal intent common to all crimes.
Wills, J., makes a statement in this same Tolson case, which more
nearly represents the theory of the law. "It is, however, undoubtedly
a principle of English criminal law that ordinarily speaking a crime
is not committed if the mind of the person doing an act in question
be innocent. * * * The guilty intent is not necessarily that of
intending the very act or thing done and prohibited by common or
statute law, but it must at least be the intention to do something wrong.
That intention may belong to one or the other of two classes. It may
be to do a thing wrong in itself and apart from positive law, or it may
be to do a thing merely prohibited by statute or by common law, or
both elements of intention may co-exist with respect to the same
deed.""' In other words a person must be blameworthy, in having
either an anti-legal or anti-moral intention.
The point on which Justice Stephen apparently goes astray, is the
difficulty of distinguishing motive from intent."9 It is, of course, true
that honest motives are no legal defence, where one consciously and
knowingly violates the law, as in the case of anarchists and con-
scientious objectors.2' Bad motive is not a necessary element of
criminal intent. Conduct may be flagrantly illegal, and at the same
time morally innocent or even heroic. But criminal intent, or account-
able mind, involves the capacity to know the rightfulness or wrongful-
ness of the conduct, according to the law or the accepted moral stand-
ards of the community. This is the basis of the defence of mistake of
fact, which is a defence not merely because it negatives specific intent,
but also because it negatives guilt and the conscious choice of wrongful
"5Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 256; 2 Pollock & Maitland, History of Eng-
lish Law, p. 474.
loPer Cockburn, J., in Reg. v. Sleep, 8 Cox C. C. 472, 477.
1723 Q. B. Div. 168.
IsBeale's Cases, Crim. Law (3rd ed.) p. 237.
19See W. W. Cook, Act, Intent and Motive, 26 Yale Law Journal 645, 661.
2"Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145; U. S. v. Harmon, 45 Fed. 414. Stroud,
Men's Rea, p. 10.
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conduct. According to Reg. v. Prince,2 1' mistake of fact is no defence if
the defendant knows he is doing an act immoral or evil in itself.
Notwithstanding the mistaken belief there is a guilty. state of mind.22
In the case of Chisholm v. Doulton,2 3 Cave, J., says: "It is a
general principle of our criminal law that there must be as an essential
ingredient in a criminal offence, some blameworthy condition of mind.
Sometimes it is negligenqe, sometimes malice, sometimes guilty know-
ledge, but as a general rule there must be something of that kind
which is designated by the expression mens rea." In other words,
the general principle of the law is that a crime is not proved if the
mind of the person doing the act is morally innocent. This involves
knowledge of its wrongful or illegal character.
In Sherras v. Rutzen,2 4 Wright, J., says: There is a presumption
that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of
the act is an essential ingredient in every, offence."
In Bank of New South Wales v. Piper,25 in the opinion of the
Privy Council it is said: "The questions whether a particular intent
is made an element of the statutory crime, and when that is not the
case, whether there was an absence of mens rea in the accused, are
questions entirely different, and depend upon different considerations.
In cases when the statute requires a motive to be proved as an essential
element of the crime, the prosecution must fail if it is not proved. On
the other hand, the absence of mens rea really consists in an honest
and reasonable belief entertained by the accused of the existence of
facts, which, if true, would make the act charged against him innocent."
This is a clear statement of the distinction between specific intent and
mens rea in the sense of innocence or absence of moral blame. So in
Hale's Pleas of the Crown, p. 42, it is said: "Ignorance of fact doth
excuse for such an ignorance; many times makes the act itself morally
involuntary."
28
Prof. Keedy's proposed test would make insane persons criminally
responsible for violating statutory prohibitions where no specific intent
is necessary, and where fines are imposed as an incentive to compel
persons to comply with the regulations at their peril. It is believed,
21L. R. 2 C. C. 154 (1875), Beale's Cases. Cr. Law, p. 275, 280.
22Bishop, Stat. Const.. sec. 490: Cp. D. Trowbridge. Calif. Law Rev. VII,
p. 1; Holton v. State, 28 Fla. 303, 308: Brown v. State, 23 Del. 159, 74 At. 836,
25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661; Maguire v. People, 219 I1. 16.
2322 Q. B. Div. 736. Beale's Cases, p. 257.
24(1895) 1 Q. B. 918, Beale's Cases Cr. Law, p. 260.
25(1897) Appeal Cases. 383. Beale's Cases Cr. Law, p. 265.
2-See also Rex v. Ahlers (1915), 1 K. B. 616. 625; Cp. C. Kenny, 31 Law
Quar. Rev. 299.
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however, that competent age, sanity and some degree of freedom
from coercion are always presupposed in any case for criminality.
Prof. Keedy.states,27 "that the tests of irresponsibility now em-
ployed consist simply of a statement of certain mental symptoms, viz.,
inability to distinguish between right and wrong, irresistible impulse,
and delusion, the existence of one or more of which is treated by the
law as a defence. These symptoms," he says, "represent but a small
portion of- the phenomena of mental disease, and they bear no neces-
sary-relation to the ordinary legal rules for determining responsibility.
They are simply obsolete medical theories crystallized into rules of law."
This appears to the writer to represent an absolute failure to
understand the ethical basis of these rules of law, viz., that criminal
responsibility rests upon moral accountability as in the case of children
from 7 to 14. As pointed out by Somerville, J., in his notable opinion
in Parsons v.State,2 (probably the best exposition of the subject in
the books) : "There must be two constituent elements of legal re-
sponsibility in the commission of every crime, and no rule can be just
and reasonable which fails to recognize either of them: (1) capacity
of intellectual discrimination; and (2) freedom of will." These are
tests of responsibility in criminal cases because without such powers
a man is not morally accountable.
Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in the famous case of Common-
wealth v. Rogers,2 9 is often quoted: "In order to commit a crime, a
person must have intelligence and capacity enough to have a criminal
intent and purpose; and if his reason and mental powers are either
so deficient that he has no will, no conscience or controlling mental
power, or if through the overwhelming violence of mental disease, his
intellectual power is for the time being obliterated, he is not a respon-
sible moral agent and is not punishable for criminal acts."
The right and wrong and irresistible impulse tests are, therefore,
not based on obsolete medical theories or on arbitrary symptoms of in-
sanity, but on the general conditions of legal responsibility. Insane per-
sons, like intoxicated persons may have intent to kill, to set fire to
houses, to steal, to rape, or to defraud; but the great question is whether
the defendant is a responsible moral agent. Crime does not exist unless
the actor can be regarded as morally responsible for his act. If not,
he is not culpable and does not deserve punishment. As Stephen says,
"Legal punishment connotes as far as possible moral infamy. 0
2730 Harvard. Law Rev.. p. 555.
2881 Ala. 577. 2 So. 854; 60 Am. Rep. 193, Beale's Cases Cr. Law, p. 342.
2P(1884) 7 Metc. 500.
802 Stephen "Hist. Crim. Law," p. 81, 91, 172, 183.
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The general subjective conditions of criminality, presupposed as
a general rule in addition to the particular state of mind, motive or
intent included in the definition of various crimes, are then as follows:
(1) competent age; (2) some degree of sanity; (3) freedom from
overpowering coercion, and (4) a "punishable state of mind," i. e.,-
some blameworthy foim of intentionality, consisting either of intent
to commit some crime or to do some serious wrong. 1 Gross or
culpable negligence may in the case of a killing and perhaps of assault,
take the place of intent to do wrong.32 While a guilty mind or con-
scious wrong-doing is usually an essential ingredient of crime, yet this
fourth element may be excluded in police regulations for the sake
of practical enforcement, and persons may be held to act at their peril
even where they labor under ignorance or mistake as to the circum-
stances and no intent to break the law or to do a forbidden act is
proved. In such cases, a general correspondence between guilt and
.punishment will suffice. 33  This stringent rule of diligence or acting
at peril, should clearly not be applied as against incompetent persons.
Mens rea, or accountable mind to the extent of the first three con-
ditions of criminality, is still required.
The doctrine of constructive intent, or criminal liability for the
accidental consequences of attempts to carry out some criminal pur-
pose, involves intent to do something wrong in itself. This is applicable
only where the criminal intent is to do something malum in se and
not where it is merely to do something malum prohibitum .
34
The positivist school of criminologists, represented by the Italian
writers Ferri, Garafalo and Lombroso, reject the postulate of the
classical school embodied in our present law, that the basis of the
right of punishment is an abuse of free choice or moral liberty. They
are determinists and deny the freedom of the will. According to them,
punishment should not be based on moral culpability. Physical im-
putability of the criminal act is sufficient to constitute penal account-
ability. For the positivists, every crime is the effect of irresistible
forces, and is a mere symptom of its author's dangerous criminal
tendency. Penal treatment should be governed by the characteristics
of the agent, rather than by the gravity of the particular offence' for
which he happens to be prosecuted. Punishment should fit the criminal
31Cp. II Stephen Hist. Cr. Law, 91; Gen. View p. 68.
32 See L. R. A. 1918 B, p. 954, note; L. R. A. 1917 D, 950, note.
3 3Tenement House Dept. v. McDevitt, 215 N. Y. 160; Hobbs v. Winchester
Corp. (1910), 2 K. B., 461, 471.
34CoImmzonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323; State v. Horton, 139 N. C. 588,
Beale's Cases Crim. Law, p. 239; Cont. v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, Beale's Cases
Crim. Law, p. 300.
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rather than the crime. The justification of punishment is to be found
in considerations of social defence. In fact all punishment as such,
is unjust, since no action is good or bad, or worthy of praise'or blame
or repentance. The attitude of the law in dealing with crime should
be the same as dealing with the insane.8 5 The infliction of punishment
is to be considered as a clinic designed to combat a social and indi-
vidual malady, rather than the verification of a threat of retribution
which hangs over wrong doers.
The positivist theory is neither practical nor convincing. 8 As a
matter of metaphysics, the question of free will versus determinism
may be worthy of speculative discussion, but for practical purposes
the law must accept the common-sense postulate of free will upon
which we all act. We assume in normal persons moral responsibility.
They are acountable for their acts, and may justly be punished if
they fail to control their conduct.37
In the case of State v. Strasburg,3s an argument was made along
the lines of the positivist theory. It was urged that the defenc of
insanity might be abolished now that the modern humane treatment
of those convicted of crime practically removes them from the realm
of punishment and places them in a position little different from the
insane. The central idea upon which the whole fabric of criminal
jurispudence was formerly built, was the idea 'that every criminal
act was the product of a free will, possessing a full understanding of
the difference between right and wrong, and full capacity to choose
a right or wrong course of action. It was urged, however, that modem
science shows that a dominant percentage of all criminals are not free
moral agents, but as a result of hereditary influences and early en-
vironments are either mentally or morally degenerate, or their crimes
are committed under the degenerating influence of intoxicating liquor.
It is accordingly folly to punish, and further to debase the individual,
as the element of free will is no longer to be taken into consideration.
These arguments were rejected by the Washington Court, which
pointed out that the stern and awful fact still. remains, that the status
and condition in the eyes of the world and under the law of one con-
victed of crime is vastly different, from that of one simply adjudged
insane. The element of punishment still exists in our criminal law.
35Ferri, Criminal Sociology, p. 360, 362.
3GSee The Concept of Punishment, by Ugo Conti XIII Illinois Law Re-
view, p. 234.
37See Responsibility and Crime, by E. S. Kite, Jour. Crim. Law & Crim.,
V, p. 63.
3860 Wash. 106, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1216.
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While it is true that punishment is largly an instinctive matter
and various factors, social and individual enter in, yet it cannot be
denied that it expresses the indignation and condemnation of society
to an extent measured by the severity of punishment, which must be
adequate to the shock which the offence gives to public feeling; other-
wise mob violence may be resorted to. It must, therefore, be felt
to be a just equivalent for what the offender has inflicted, and must
consider the degree of moral guilt in the offender, not with misplaced
tenderness but with discriminating severity. Insane persons are not
punishable not only because punishment would not be beneficial to
them but because it would not be just. In general, the justification
of punishment is not to be found in its effects upon those whom it
does not deter, but upon those to whom its threats may supply a
motive of self-restraint. The capacity of distinguishing right from
wrong is a test of responsibility, because without such power of dis-
crimination there is no blame, and guilt determines liability to criminal
punishment. 9
In the case of children between 7 and 14, the test of responsibility
is whether the child is capable of appreciating the nature of his acts
and distinguishing between right and wrong.40 Consciousness of guilt
may be shown by hiding and concealment which evidence a capacity
to discern between good and evil. Delinquency of a child on the other
hand, is not regarded as guilt of crime, but indicates need for a change
of custody for the protection of the infant and society, and not for
punishment.4 1
We have thus far considered the theory and basis of the legal
tests of criminal responsibility. It is necessary, also, to consider how
they work out in practice. Is the knowledge of the right and wrong
test a safe and satisfactory working rule? According to the leading
authority, McNaghten's case,42 the main test is: Did the accused at
the time, know that he was doing wrong? If not, he cannot be con-
victed. How can this be directly proved to the jury? Dr. H. Oppen-
heimer suggests the following: 48 "Whilst the most definite proof
should be required of the existence of mental disease, when once it
has been established that the prisoner is a lunatic, the present pre-
89Markby, Elements of Law, sec. 730, p. 354; Kenny, Outlines Criminal
Law, p. 37; Bishop, New Criminal Law, 8th ed., sec. 286; Ames, Law and
Morals, 22 Harv. Law Rev. 97, 99.
40R. v. Owen, 4 C. & P., p. 236.4'Juvenile Court v. State, 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S. W. 771, Ann. Cases,
1918 D, 752.
424 St. Tr. (N. S.) 847; 10 Clark & Fin., p. 200, Beale's Caseg Cr. Law,
p. 326.43The Criminal Responsibility of Lunatics, p. 253.
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sumption of law should be reversed; and those proved to be of unsound
mind should be assumed until the contrary be shown, not to know
the nature and quality of their acts and that that which they were doing
was wrong." Thus it need not be positively proved that defendant
was not able to distinguish right from wrong, or that his ignorance
extended to the very act of which he is accused. If the evidence
exhibits morbid impulses; if the will is weakened; if the intelligence
is of low grade; if there are delusions, obsessions, or other symptoms
of mental disease, this evidence may raise a presumption of such dis-
turbance of the mental and volitional faculties as to exclude intelligent
choice of conduct.
According to one of the rules of McNaghten's case, if the accused
is stibject to partial insane delusions, or monomania, he is to be treated
as if his delusions were true. Thus if A kills B, the result is; (1) if
A did not know that he was doing wrong, he cannot be held account-
able; (2) if A thought that B was about to do him grievous bodily
harm, A is not guilty, for assuming the delusion to be true; A is
simply acting in self-defence; but (3) if A knew he were doing wrong,
or (4) if A acted under some delusion which, if true, would not have
justified his act, e. g., that B had been intimate with A's wife; in
both these cases A would be guilty of murder.44 The delusion would,
however, be available as evidence that A did not know that he was
doing wrong, even if its truth would not create such mistake of fact
as to justify the act.
If A kills B knowing that he is killing B, and knowing that it is
illegal to kill B, but under the insane delusion that the salvation of
the country or of the human race will be obtained by getting himself
executed for the murder of B, and that God has commaiided him to
get himself sacrificed in this way, his action under this delusion will
not be punishable, if knowledge of right and wrong refers to moral
wrong rather than to conscious illegality. Our analyqis shows that
moral wrong is the test which should be adopted and this has been
so held in New York.4 5 Thus one acting under the insane delusion
that God has appeared to him and ordered the commision' of a crime
by him, is not guilty, although he knows his act to be contriry to law,
because he is incapable of understanding the wickedness of his deed
and-is not morally responsible. "
McNaghten's case, however, seems to hold that in the case of
partial delusions or monomania, guilt should be made to depend on




whether the delusion was such, that if, things were as he imagined
them to be, he would be legally justified in the act. This idea- has
been much criticized on the ground that there is no such thing as
partial insanity, and that one cannot be affected with insane delusions
on one or more particular subjects without affecting the entire mind.
If one screw is loose, the whole machine is affected. Accordingly the
Supreme Court of Colorado has held that hallucinations, delusions and
paranoia may relieve from responsibility, not only when the imaginary
facts, if true, would excuse, but also, even if the supposed grievances
or wrongs would not legally jtistify the act. The existence and nature
of the delusion, is not the test of responsibility, but is evidence on the
question whether the mind is so impaired, unbalanced and beclouded
that defendant is not a responsible moral agent. If the defendant is
laboring under delusion that he is redressing or avenging some sup-
posed injury, or producing some supposed public benefit, the fact that
he knew at the time that he was acting contrary to law, should not
necessarily make him accountable.
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If A suddenly stabs B under the influence of impulse, caused by
disease of such a nature that nothing but mechanical restraint would
have prevented the stab, A is not punishable if absence of power of
control is recognized as a defence, but would be punishable if a strong
motive, such as fear of punishment, might have prevented the act.
Only those ought to be punished, whom the threat of the law could
or might have deterred from the act.47 According to the theory of
moral responsibility, both the right and wrong test, and the irresistible
impulse test ought to be recognized. If free will and self-restraint be
destroyed by mental disease, knowledge of right and wrong is entirely
useless. Will is as necessary an element of criminal intent as are reason
and judgment.48 Nevertheless, in many jurisdictions uncontrollable im-
pulse is not a defence unless the defendant was also unable to dis-
tinguish right from wrong.4 9 Where a man's acts are automatic and
mechanical, the explosive discharge of motor centers which the patient
is helpless to prevent, the established legal test of right 'and wrong
cannot be strictly applied without injustice. The controlling influence
of the inhibitory centers is for the time being suspended, and the acts
may be the mechanical reflex movements from internal or external
4 6Ryan v. The People, 60 Colo. 425, L. R. A. 1917 F, p. 646; Hotema v. U. S.,
186 U. S., p. 413.
47Oppenheimer, Criminal Responsibility of Luinatics, p. 129.
48Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 596, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193. See also
Hawkins v. State, L. R. A. 1918 D, 784, 794 note. Prof. E. R. Keedy, 30 Harv.
Law Rev. 546.
49Snith v. State, Ann. Cas. 1912 A, p. 36, note.
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suggestions. The defendant is not their author, but their victim.50
The, recognition- of the principle that punishment should be in
proportion to the gravity of the crime and the culpability of the
criminal, indicates the basis of qualified responsibility as resting on
the degree of guilt of the partly responsible persons. Feeble minded-
ness, for example, might well be admitted as a ground for discretionary
reduction of penalty, even if not a full defence. Prof. Keedy's pro-
posed test of absence of specific intent, seems to furnish no adequate
guide to diminished responsibility for the feeble minded.-
The defendant may have some sense of right and wrong, he may
be aware that punishment will follow detection, but he may have far
less appreciation of the consequences of his acts and less self-control
than normal men or even children. Can we say that some knowledge
of right and wrong and self-control, however, poor and imperfect, are
sufficient? Suppose they are less than in normal children of 7, 10 or
14 years of age? Want of judgment, lack of will, and weakness of
character, make the feeble minded and defective persons an easy prey
to their passions and impulses. The law has failed to take sufficient
account of the possibility of different degrees of accountability of those
not altogether innocent. At present, the jury fills up the gaps existing
in the law of responsibility, and takes into consideration the moral
elements and motives of crime. Those who as a result of hereditary
taint and unfortunate environment, are mentally and morally degener-
ate, have not full penal accountability with normal men any more than
little children, and if punishable at all, are punishable in a much less
degree. 2
It may be suggested in conclusion, that the main issue where the
defence of insanity is raised, is whether the defendent is morally
accountable for his act, and if so, to what degree? The inquiries to
be submitted for the guidance of the jury in determining this question,
should be in substance, these :-1. Was the defendant at the time of
the commission of the act afflicted with a disease of the mind, or with
defect of intelligence, comparable to that of a child under (say) 14
years? 2. Was the alleged criminal act so connected with such mental
disease or defective intelligence as to be regarded as the offspring or
product of it, either in whole or in part?. 3. Is the defendant to be re-
garded as -culpable or blameworthy, according to the two following tests:
5ODr. Alfred Gordon, Mental Deficiency, Jour. Crim. Law, IX, pp. 404, 410
(Nov. 1918).
5-See 30 Harv. Law Rev. 551 to 554. Cp. Tarde, Penal Philosophy, p. 186,
187.
52State v. Richards (1873), 39 Conn. 591; Beale's Cas. Cr. Law, p. 333;
Arnold, Psychology and Legal Evidence, p. 503.
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(1) Did he know that he was doing wrong, something that he ought
not to do? (2) Had he so far lost the normal power of volition, that he
was not able to avoid doing the act in question? 4. Where his intelli-
gence and volition so far below normal, that although dimly conscious
that his act was wrong, he was only partially accountable? Should
his mental condition be considered in mitigation of punishment?
This represents a modification of the questions proposed in the
case of Parsons v. The State, 3 and differs from the suggestion of the
New Hampshire court in State v. Jones,54 in inquiring into the moral
quality of the act, and not merely whether it was the direct product
of mental disorder, without regard to the degree to which the disease
had progressed, or to the extent to which it had deprived him of the
knowledge of right and wrong, or of the capacity for self-control. If
the defendant has only subnormal capability for controlling his
actions, he may still be regarded as punishable in some degree, in spite
of a somewhat low order of intelligence or a somewhat unbalanced
mentality, which may also warrant custodial care.
The more corrupt the defendant's heredity and the more defective
his mentality, the less his moral blame and punishability, but from
the social viewpoint, the greater is the necessity for sending him to a
proper institution. Neither imprisonment nor probation and parole
are suited to defective delinquents who cannot become normal citizens.
It is accordingly urged by Dr. Hickson, that farm and industrial
colonies should be established so that dangerous morons, mental per-
verts and other degenerates may be placed under lasting restraint and
supervision according to their needs. The establishment of suitable
institutions for the feeble-minded, a half-way house between the peni-
tentiary and the insane asylum, is a crying need in Illinois and in
other states. In the alienist, the farm colony and the asylum lie
society's protection against abnormal persons rather than in the crimi-
nal law. Any one who by reason of feeble mindedness, insanity or
other disorder, mental or physical, such as leprosy or syphilis, becomes
a menace to the safety or health of the public, should be confined for
purposes of quarantine and treatment. This should be done on custo-
dial principles rather than on principles of the criminal law, which
deals with definite acts of wrongdoing rather than with general con-
ditions of potential menace.
5381 Ala. 577.
5450 N. H. 369.
